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This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, published by Elsevier in . The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.Description: This paper considers whether international environmental public goods provision, such as mitigation of climate change, is better dealt with through regional cooperation than through a global treaty. Previous research suggests that, at best, a global environmental treaty will achieve very little. At worst, it will fail to enter into force. Using a simple dynamic game-theoretic model, with weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium as solution concept, we demonstrate that two agreements can sustain a larger number of cooperating parties than a single global treaty. The model provides upper and lower bounds on the number of parties under each type of regime. It is shown that a regime with two agreements can Pareto dominate a regime based on a single global treaty. We conclude that regional cooperation might be a good alternative-or supplement-to global environmental agreements.
